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【Abstract】This paper analyzes influence of an additional referee on number of fouls by using 
the data from Women’s Japan Basketball League (WJBL) in order to examine whether number 
of police officers affects the crime rate. For the season of 2010-2011, the upper league of the 
WJBL introduced 3 referees system for the adaption of the international standard. Using this 
natural experiment, the Difference in Difference and the Instrumental Variable method are used 
to remove endogeneity. The results indicate that increased number of referees decrease number 
of fouls after considering both reverse causality and unobservable heterogeneity. 
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1. Introduction 
Backer (1968)’s economic theory of crime shows that crime rate decreases when police 
resource increase due to the rise in expected cost to be arrested. However, it is difficult to prove 
that empirically because it is often the case that police officers are employed more in a 
crime-ridden area. Hence, the reverse causality causes bias in the estimation.  
Previous studies that have strived to overcome endogeneity problem are categorized into 
four. Firstly, the most frequently used approach is to use the Instrumental Variable method as in 
Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), Levitt (1997), Evans and Owens (2007), Lin (2009) and Worrall 
and Kavandzic (2010). Secondly, there are studies used the allocation of police officers after the 
terrorism regardless the crime rate as in Klick and Tabarrork (2004), Draca, Machin and Witt 
(2011). Additionally, some researchers analyze by using monthly data sets as it takes time to 
actually increase the number of police force after the decision is made to an increase such as 
Corman and Mocan (2000). Finally, there are studies conducted by using data sets of sports 
match, which is the approach of this paper.  
The seminal work using the data of sports match is McCormick and Tollison (1984).Their 
paper uses the data from the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) Basketball Tournament. It uses 
the natural experiment that the ACC introduced three referees system from two referees system 
in 1979. By regarding referees as police officers, and fouls as illegal activities, it examines 
whether the increase of referees (police officers) decreases the number of fouls (illegal 
activities). This approach successfully overcomes the issue of above mentioned reverse 
causality by using the natural experiment that the number of referee is increased randomly. 
Although Hutchinson and Yates (2007) points out data-coding error for this work, McCormick 
and Tollison (2007) shows the similar result that the number of referees affects the number of 
fouls even after correcting the data-coding error. However, Hutchinson and Yates (2006) claims 
that the number of referees does not influence the number of fouls by analyzing the data set that 
is created by adding data from subsequent years of the ACC tournament on the data set used by 
McCormick and Tollison (1984) as well as using box score.  
Other than the basketball, several researches also conduct analyses by using the data of the 
National Hockey League (NHL). During 1998-99 season, the NHL randomly increased number 
of referees in 20% of total number of game match. Levitt (2002), Allen (2002), and Heckleman 
and Yates (2003) uses this natural experiment to investigate the influence of referee increase. 
Heckleman and Yates (2003) uses the Instrumental Variable method to divide the effect into 
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monitoring effect and deterrent effect. These researches using the data of the NHL find no 
significant influence.  
As seen, several researchers have already investigated the effect of the increased police 
presences on crime by using sports data in order to consider reverse causality. Nevertheless, 
endogeneity problem between crime and police occurs not only because of the issue of above 
mentioned reverse causality, but also unobservable factors that correlate with both police force 
and crime such as recognition and reaction to the increased risk or the ability to commit a crime 
without being noticed by the police. These issues also exist in the analysis by using the data of 
sports match. Therefore, this paper firstly carries outs the analysis by using the Difference in 
Difference estimation for the purpose of considering the reverse causality by using the WJBL 
data. Then, this paper conducts the second analysis by using Instrumental variable method in 
order to control for unobservable heterogeneity among players. As a result, the Difference in 
Difference estimation, which considers only the reverse causalities, shows no significant 
influence of increased number of referees on the number of fouls. This result is consistent with 
the many previous researches. Nonetheless, when both reverse causality and unobservable 
heterogeneity among players are considered by using Instrumental Variable estimation, the rise 
in the number of referees decreases the number of fouls. 
This paper is organized as follows. The natural experiment of the WJBL and the data are 
presented in the following section. The Difference in Difference estimation is presented in 
section three. The Instrumental Variable estimation is presented in section four. Finally, section 
five concludes.  
2. The WJBL experiment and data 
The WJBL has the upper league (W league) and the lower league (W1 league). Before 
2009-2010 season, both leagues basically had two referees system, and used three referees 
system only during playoff. In the season of 2010-2011, the new system of three referees was 
only introduced to the W league. This new system was introduced for the purpose of adapting 
the rule to the international standard. So the number of referee was increased exogenously.  
Figure 1 show the number of fouls per game for the past seven years. The number of fouls in 
both the W league and the W1 league is the same level. So there isn’t the situation that more 
fouls are likely to be observed in the games for the upper league. 
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FIGURE 1 Number of fouls per game for the past seven years  
 
 
When it comes to the homogeneity of the W league and the W1 league throughout the time, 
between the season 2009-2010 and the season 2010-2011, there was only one exchange in 
league members. Moreover, transfers of players only happen after each season, and registrations 
of foreign players are basically not admitted. Therefore, the treatment group and the control 
group are almost homogeneous throughout the time.  
This paper uses this natural experiment to investigate whether the increased number of 
referees decreases the number of fouls. Data set to be used in the paper is the players’ statistics 
of the WJBL 2009-2010 and the WJBL 2010-2011. They are available from the website of the 
WJBL. Although box score (data of each game) can be obtained, it is impossible to identify 
games that categorized as same in the analysis throughout two years. Hence, panel data cannot 
be constructed. Additionally, box scores are more influenced by unobservable heterogeneity 
among games. On the other hand, the data set of the seasons enable analysis to estimate the 
effect of the increased number of referees without being less affected by heterogeneity among 
each game, as well as utilizing the merit of panel data. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
number of sample average standard error minimum maximum
Dependent variable
293 0.144 0.725 -2.485 1.273
Independent variable
293 0.608 0.489 0.000 1.000
293 17.567 7.966 1.000 28.000
293 0.453 0.022 0.409 0.492
293 0.311 0.016 0.293 0.343
293 0.752 0.015 0.719 0.774
293 6.372 4.406 0.000 20.140
293 -172.569 7.216 -191.253 -153.240
293 0.000 0.006 -0.010 0.014
Positiion: Center dummy 293 0.123 0.329 0.000 1.000
Positiion:Center Forward dummy 293 0.232 0.423 0.000 1.000
Positiion:Small Forward dummy 293 0.263 0.441 0.000 1.000
Positiion:Guard dummy 293 0.191 0.394 0.000 1.000
Positiion: Shooting Guard dummy 293 0.177 0.383 0.000 1.000
Positiion: Point Guard dummy 293 0.014 0.116 0.000 1.000
       position dummies
average score of each game
the gap between the average height of players
the age differences between the head coaches
Variable
success rate three-point field goal of other teams
in the same league
success rate free throws of other teams in the
same league
logarithm of fouls per game
W league dummy
number of game match
success rate of two-point goal of other teams in
the same league
 
As for the dependent variable, the log of number of fouls per game is used. As for 
independent variables, in addition to the number of referees, variables referring McCormick and 
Tollison (1984) are used. They are: number of game match, success rate of two-point goal, 
three-point field goal and free throws of other teams in the same league, average score of each 
game, the gap between the average height of players belongs to other teams in the same league 
and the height of each player, the age differences between the head coach of other teams in the 
same league and the head coach of the team each player belongs to as a proxy for years of 
experience. And the position dummies are also used. 
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3. Difference in Difference Estimation 
Firstly, the Difference in Difference is used to overcome the reverse causality. Empirical 
model is as follows. 
ln ܨ݋ݑ݈௜௧ ൌ ߙ ′ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉ݕ௧ ൅ ߚ′ܹܮ݁ܽ݃ݑ݁ܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜ ൅ ߛ ′ܦܦ௜௧ ൅ ߜ ′ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧      (1) 
Where i indicates a player, t indicates year. YearDummy୲	denotes a vector of year dummies, 
WLeagueDummy୧ is the vector of W league dummies. DD୧୲ is the vector of Difference in 
Difference estimator. There DD term measures the effect of increased referees on the number of 
fouls. A vector ௜ܺ௧ indicates other independent variables. 
Table2 Difference in Difference Estimation 
Note 1. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(1) (2)
5.9955 5.9673
(5.9169) (5.7111)
-1.3619 -1.3769
(1.0351) (1.0089)
-5.9360 -5.9128
(5.4898) (5.2830)
0.0408*** 0.0409***
(0.0058) (0.0063)
5.0594 4.3732
(8.8016) (8.5159)
130.5237 129.2365
(143.5017) (137.9341)
15.7396*** 16.5888***
(4.2518) (4.3472)
0.0686*** 0.0684***
(0.0075) (0.0074)
-0.0085 -0.0127
(0.0061) (0.0161)
101.0160 98.5985
(122.5971) (118.6231)
0.1023
(0.1182)
-0.0098
(0.1494)
0.1601
(0.2626)
0.0565
(0.1609)
0.1212
(0.1855)
-54.7879 -55.4952
(45.4912) (43.5010)
Observations 293 293
R-squared 0.55 0.56
Constant
number of game match
success rate of two-point goal of other 
teams in the same league 
success rate three-point field goal of 
other teams in the same league 
success rate free throws of other teams 
in the same league 
Positiion: Point Guard dummy
DD estimator
2010 dummy
 W league dummy
Positiion:Small Forward dummy
Positiion: Shooting Guard dummy
average score of each game
the gap between the average height of 
players
the age differences between the head 
coaches
Positiion: Center dummy
Positiion:Center Forward dummy
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Table 2 presents the result obtained by the Difference in Difference estimation. The focus of 
this paper, the coefficient of the DD term which measures the effect of increased referees on the 
number of fouls does not show the significant influence for both specifications even at 10% 
level. This means increase in the number of referees does not influence the number of fouls. 
4. Instrumental Variable Estimation 
The above Difference in Difference estimation has the possibility of correlation between the 
variable of the number of referees and the error term if unobservable heterogeneity among 
players, which may affect the number of fouls, changes over time. For instance, there is 
individual ability that a player can make rule violation without being called. If she has the high 
ability of deceiving referees, the number of fouls decreases. Moreover, it is expected that these 
individuals have higher technique of ball handling and positioning. Consequently, these players 
are likely to play in the upper league (W league) which has increased the number of referees. If 
this is the case, the influence of increased number of referees appears to be small in the 
estimation.  
In order to control for such unobservable heterogeneity among players, panel data of players 
who are existed for both seasons is constructed and the Instrumental Variable estimation is 
conducted. The base model is as follows. 
ln ܨ݋ݑ ௜݈௧ ൌ ܴ݂݁݁ݎ݁݁௜௧′ ߚ ൅ ௜ܺ௧′ ߛ ൅ ݑ௜௧           (2) 
Where i indicates a player, t indicates year. Error term is described as ݑ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅ ݒ௜௧. ߤ௜ is 
unobserved heterogeneity among players. ݒ௜௧ is ݒ௜௧~݅݅݀ሺ0, ߪ௩ଶሻ and does not correlate with 
X୧୲ 	and	Referee୧୲ . In order to remove the effect of	ߤ௜, the first difference of (2) is taken. So the 
basic econometric specification is as follows. 
∆ln ܨ݋ݑ ௜݈௧ ൌ ∆ܴ݂݁݁ݎ݁݁௜௧′ ߚ ൅ ∆ ௜ܺ௧′ ߛ ൅ ∆ݑ௜௧ 
Furthermore, for the purpose of taking endogeneity, which exists between Referee୧୲ and Foul୧୲, 
into consideration, the number of players registered by each team in the previous season is used 
as the instrumental variable. Because the teams with larger number of players tend to have 
richer financial resources and better players, these teams are likely to play in the upper league 
(W league) in the following year, and to be the subject to the three referee system.  
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(1) (2)
-2.9020** -2.5417*
(1.2815) (1.1926)
0.0308*** 0.0300***
(0.0080) (0.0080)
6.1069 3.2689
(13.4472) (12.6536)
332.7990** 304.2878**
(120.6080) (103.6706)
-41.9051** -36.5209**
(17.8380) (15.7843)
0.0870*** 0.0863***
(0.0168) (0.0168)
-234.9237** -214.8362**
(88.2572) (76.2010)
259.4096** 236.9946**
(103.8170) (87.9387)
0.3369***
(0.1043)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.1621***
(0.0468)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.0000
(0.0000)
5.2500** 4.7683**
(1.9850) (1.7174)
Observations 113 113
R-squared 0.40 0.41
Positiion: Point Guard dummy
Constant
Positiion: Shooting Guard dummy
number of referees
number of game match
success rate of two-point goal of other 
teams in the same league 
success rate three-point field goal of 
other teams in the same league 
success rate free throws of other teams 
in the same league 
average score of each game
the gap between the average height of 
players
the age differences between the head 
coaches
Positiion: Center dummy
Positiion:Center Forward dummy
Positiion:Small Forward dummy
Table 3 Instrumental Variable Estimation 
Note  1. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table3 shows the result of the Instrumental Variable estimation. This result shows that the 
coefficient of the variable of the increased number of referees is statistically significant at 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. This means the increase of referees decreases the number of fouls 
when the reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity among player are considered. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes influence of an additional referee on number of fouls by using the data 
from WJBL. The difficult problem of the empirical analysis of the relationship between the 
police existence and the crime rate is endogeneity problem. It is often the case that crime ridden 
area increases the number of police officers. Moreover, unobservable factors, which correlate 
with both number of police officers and crime rate, could cause bias in estimation. This paper 
uses the natural experiment conducted in WJBL to overcome reverse causality. Additionally, the 
Instrumental Variable estimation is employed to control for unobservable heterogeneity that 
correlate with the number of fouls and the number of referees.  
First estimation using the Difference in Difference shows no significant influence of 
increased number of referees on the number of fouls. This is consistent with many previous 
studies used data of sports match. However, this estimation only deals with the reverse causality. 
Therefore, the second estimation uses the Instrumental Variable method to control for 
unobservable heterogeneity among players. This estimation revealed that increased number of 
referees decreases the number of fouls. This result is consistent with the result predicted in the 
economic theory of crime.  
When applying the result of this paper to the reality of crime, the result, which is obtained 
from the estimation taking both reverse causality and unobservable heterogeneity among 
players into consideration, suggests that increasing policing force decrease crime rate. It is 
particularly effective to prevent crime that was unplanned and committed by the quick 
judgment like fouls in the basketball match.  
Some issues still remain. This paper is unable to make a distinction between monitoring 
effect and deterrent effect. Nonetheless, it is understood that deterrent effect is greater than the 
monitoring effect because the total number of fouls has declined. Hence, increasing policing 
force has both effects, and consequently reduces crime. Also, players who are close to be a 
champion or not, or players who are facing to drop out to the lower league or promoted to the 
upper league may have different expected cost and benefit as other players. These differences 
need to be concerned in the future analysis.  
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